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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
:
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
: Case No. 20040324-CA

JOSEPH DELEE ANTENCIO,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Burglary a
third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-202 (1953). The trial
court, sitting with a jury, found the Defendant guilty on February 19,
2004. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN
AND
TWELVE
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE

TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT AND FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A
JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING
THE
VERDICT?
STANDARD

OF REVIEW:

The appellate

court

must

determine as a matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied
his right to effective assistance of counsel.

In

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was
ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.
2d at 69|3.

POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN
ERROR IN FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED
VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF
THE CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE
WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
2

CONVICTION AND THE BURGLARY CHARGE
SHOULD
FAIL
ON
GROUNDS
OF
INCONSISTANT VERDICT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly
preserved for appeal therefore the plain error standard applies. "To
establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3)
the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
(See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah CtApp. 1992) and
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993)). In cases where the
claim is insufficient evidence, this Court has held " as a general rule,
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."
State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). However, the Court
went further to state, " It necessarily follows that the trial court plainly
errs if it submits the case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a
defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence is apparent to the
court." (Id. at 351)

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

4

UTAH CONSITITUION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county
or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

5

Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining
whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule, (emphasis added)

UTAH CODE
U.C.A.§76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or

6

(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the
offenses listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be
committed by the actor while he is in the building.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 17
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense
charged therein or any lesser included offense.

Rule 19
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid manifest
injustice.
7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with a two-count
information charging Burglary a third-degree felony in violation of
U.C.A. §76-6-202 (1953) as amended, and Theft, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404 (1953) as amended (R.
1). The Defendant was found guilty of the burglary charge, and not
guilty of the theft charge by a jury with the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
presiding on February 19, 2004. The Court sentenced the defendant to
an indeterminate sentence of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison, and
suspended that commitment and placed the defendant on probation on
March 30, 2004. (R. 209) The judgment and order on sentencing was
entered on April 6, 2004 (R. 213). On April 21, 2004, the Defendant
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 217).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of July 11, 2002 the office of International Mill
Service in Plymouth Utah was closed for business. Sometime during
the night an intruder broke a window and entered the premises. (R.253
pg. 52) The sole item taken during this burglary was a cash box that
contained approximately $130.00. (R.253 pg. 53) This cash box was
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located in the locked desk drawer of employee Susan Miller. (R.253
pg. 52) The top drawer of Ms. Miller's desk was forcibly entered,
which then allowed the intruder access to all the desk drawers. The cash
box was located in the bottom left drawer. (R.253 pg. 53) The thief
apparently did not look any further, and missed a petty cash box that
contained $100, which was located in the bottom right drawer of the
same desk. (R.253 pg. 53) Everyone who worked for IMS would have
known of the location of the cash box. The defendant had previously
worked as an employee of IMS, for a period of just over a year. He had
been fired from the company in August 2001. Ms. Miller testified that
he may have had a grudge against the company. (R.253 pg. 54) Ms.
Miller also testified that she regularly wiped down the surface of her
desk with 409 cleaner and a rag, and had done so after August 2001 and
prior to July 2002. (R.253 pg. 56)
Deputy Larry Johnson, an employee of the Box Elder County
Sheriffs office investigated the scene of the crime. He discovered a
footprint inside the building, on the top of a computer tower,
immediately below the broken window.

This window was the

presumed point of entry into the building. (R.253 pg. 63) Deputy
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Johnson also located a fingerprint on the desk of Ms. Miller, and
photographed and lifted the print. (R.253 pg. 65)
Deputy Johnson also executed a search warrant of the
defendant's house and located a pair of Herman Survivor work boots,
which were seized for evidence. (R.253 pg. 70) The boots seized at the
defendant's house had soles that would be consistent with the print left
on the computer tower. That print would have been consistent with the
boots of all employees at IMS. (R.253 pg. 72) There were no unique
marks on the boot print that would distinguish that print from any
number of work boots. (R.253 pg. 75)
Paul Rimmasch, a crime scene investigator for the Weber Metro
Crime Scene Investigative Unit testified that he examined the latent
print left at the crime scene and compared it to the defendant's finger
print and determined that they were the same. (R.253 pg. 84)
Investigator Rimmasch testified that although it is possible that a
fingerprint could survive on a desk for 11 months, it was highly
unlikely.

He fiirther testified that if it were directly wiped with a

cleaner such as Formula 409 it would not survive. (R.253 pg. 89)
The defendant testified that during his time of employment at
IMS he often went into the office as a part of his employment. He
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would often visit the desk of Ms. Miller as many as 20 times in a day.
He testified that he would open the drawer to her desk (on which the
fingerprint was found) to retrieve paper forms and office supplies.
(R.253 pg. 106)
The defendant gave no statements to the police. The defendant
was charged with the crimes of Burglary, a third degree felony and a
class A misdemeanor theft.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant was convicted of the charge of Burglary. The
State filed an information charging the defendant with burglary and
theft. The State had the burden of proving each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, and failed in its burden on the theft charge.
Once the jury returned with a finding of not guilty on the theft charge,
the burglary charge by operation of law should have also failed.
Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to notice this inconsistency
and the trial court compounded that failure by committing plain error in
not rectifying the situation by entering a judgment of acquittal on the
case. This appears to be a case of first impression in the State of Utah.
The language of the burglary statute is clear and unambiguous in setting

11

forth the elements of the offense to include an intent to commit the
secondary crime. In the case at hand, the only evidence presented to
the jury on the secondary crime was an allegation of theft. There was
absolutely no evidence that the intruder attempted to commit a theft but
was unsuccessful, since the only testimony regarding anything
disturbed in the premises was the desk drawer wherein the cash box
was located. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this
court to reverse his conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN
AND
TWELVE
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT AND FAILED TO MOVE FOR A
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In
Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine
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whether counsel's assistance was ineffective.

"First, the defendant

must show that counsel's performance was deficient.

This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at
693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington
gave some guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney
performance

remains

simply

reasonableness

under

prevailing

professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the Court in Strickland did
not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist
for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did
mention certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "the
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause" as well as "a duty
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a
reliable adversarial testing process." (Id. at 688) Additionally, the
overarching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance
of counsel cases includes a "performance inquiry [as to] whether
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances."
(Id. at 688)
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Several other cases more specifically define when a defense
counsels performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the
Court was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure
to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress
evidence under the 4th Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his
conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The

Supreme Coun affirmed that reversal. In that affirmation the Court
stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness,
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim
is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v.
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986))
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to
comport with constitutional requirements the Court held:

In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance
14

was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional
assistance in the respects alleged. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml
U.S. 365, 386 (1986))
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527,
156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court found that
counsel's failure to investigate the extensive abuse the defendant had
suffered through his life was unreasonable. The Court reversed his
conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in defense counsels
inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a capital case.
The Court stated:
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this
considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable
probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.
{Wiggins v. Smith at Point III)
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and
have likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel
cases that can guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in
his appointed duties.
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) the Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th
Amendment violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of
counsel error. In that case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a
15

situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial motion moved to
suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court
denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing.
During trial, the officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of
plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The
Court held that "where a defendant can show that there was no
conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the
first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v.
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
In the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App.
2003) the Utah Court of Appeals was presented with a case very similar
to the case at bar. The court reversed a defendant's conviction under an
ineffective assistance of counsel theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move
for a directed verdict after the State failed to present evidence that
Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon permit during its case
in chief."
In the present case defense counsel failed to move for a directed
verdict after the State failed to establish a prima facie case that the
defendant committed the alleged acts beyond a reasonable doubt. This
failure, and this failure alone constitutes ineffective assistance of
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counsel given the fact that defense counsel did surprisingly little by
way of defense. Defense counsel's entire case after the State rested
consisted of the recalling two of the State's witnesses to ask questions
regarding the durability of a fingerprint, an issue on which they had
been previously questioned. The defendant then took the stand and
testified that he had been in the office numerous times, which testimony
was consistent with Ms. Miller's prior testimony.
The deficiency of defense counsel is most glaringly demonstrated
at the time that the jury returned with its verdict of guilty on the
burglary charge and not guilty on the theft charge. Defense counsel did
not even recognize the inconsistency of those two verdicts and failed to
raise the same to the trial court. This failure was in light of the request
by the trial court for "any matter either side want[s] to place in the
record?" This inconsistent verdict will be more fully discussed in Point
II below.
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is
"the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.

17

In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the
assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding;' In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the Strickland test a
defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination
that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider the
totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and
how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id.
In the case at bar, the second prong of the Strickland test has
clearly been met. If defense counsel had made a motion to dismiss
notwithstanding the verdict, based on grounds of inconsistent verdict
and impossibility, the court, in all likelihood would have granted the
dismissal.

Furthermore, if defense counsel had made a motion to

dismiss at the end of the State's case, the trial court would have had the
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opportunity to review the case for sufficiency of evidence, which issue
the trial court did not address. As it stands, the defendant is now
relegated to a position of arguing to this Appellate Court with a higher
standard of review of plain error.

POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN
ERROR IN FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED
VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF
THE PROSECUTION'S
CASE FOR
THE
REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AND
THE BURGLARY CHARGE SHOULD FAIL ON
GROUNDS OF INCONSISTANT VERDICT?

The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of the offense of
Burglary, and Not Guilty of the additional offense of theft. The
defendant recognizes the substantial burden faced when asking an
Appellate Court to reverse on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence
to support the conviction. In the case of State v. Tucker, 96 P.3d 367,
371 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) this Court held:
To reverse a jury verdict, we must find that "the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking
or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust." "Therefore, [as] long
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as there is some evidence and reasonable inferences to
support the jury's verdict, we will not disturb a jury's
findings." (citing State v. Bradley, 576 P.3d 1142 (Utah
Ct. App. 2002) and State v. Heaps, 999P.2d 565 (Utah
2000)
See also, State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed,
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of
the jury. State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there
is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, "from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be
made, our inquiry stops." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.
The defendant is likewise cognizant of the requirement to
properly preserve the issue for appeal. In a jury trial, it is normally
required that the defendant make a motion to dismiss at the end of the
State's case. In the case of State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah Ct.
App. 2000), the Court reaffirmed the requirement that "claims not
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raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." In that case
the court held:
The preservation rule serves two important policies. First,
"in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and,
if appropriate, correct it." (citing State v. Eldredge, 113
P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989).

The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome
in challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. In
the case of State v. Silva 13 P.3d 604 (Utah App. Ct. 2000) the court
stated, "[TJhis court's power to review a jury verdict challenged on
grounds of insufficient evidence is limited." (Citations omitted) The
Utah Supreme Court has said, "So long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State
v. Mead 27 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted)
Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the
Court stated, "Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility
or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in
favor of the jury verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent
sufficient evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an
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Appellate Court may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra
at 985, the Court reversed a conviction of sexual exploitation of a
minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely
on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or
otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court
vacated the defendant's guilty verdict.
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah
1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In
that case there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been
murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact
that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact
that he had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled
slapping the girl and that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might
have killed her.7' (Id at 446) In that case the Court stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover
the gap between the presumption of innocence and the
proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as
22

it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain
a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must
be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (State v. Petree @ 444)

Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94
(Utah 2002) the Court, again recognizing the significant standard of
review required to reverse a conviction in an insufficient evidence
appeal, reversed the trial court's conviction of evidence tampering. In
that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a second,
smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was
found, but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the
defendant had the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second
weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting
[the defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we
conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. At most, the evidence supports only the
proposition that [the defendant] had the opportunity to
destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it ever
existed.

The case before this Court today brings a somewhat unique
question regarding an inconsistent jury verdict. The defendant was
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charged with burglary and theft, and the only evidence produced at trial
regarding the second element of burglary is that the Defendant
committed a theft of some $130. The jury returned a verdict of guilt on
the burglary charge and a not guilty verdict on the theft charge. The
inconsistency of these verdicts is glaringly obvious. Under Utah law a
burglary requires both an unauthorized entering together with an intent
to commit theft or other crime.
While Defendant has found one Utah case in which the
defendant was found guilty of theft, but found not guilty of burglary1
{State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)), Defendant has
not found a Utah case where the defendant was found guilty of a
burglary but acquitted of the underlying theft charge.

The Utah

burglary statute provides in relevant part:
§76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent
to commit:(b)theft;2

1

Which verdict could readily be found by a jury to be consistent where
a defendant is determined to have stolen an item, but the element of
entering or remaining unlawfully was not proven.
2
The statute provides the other possible second elements i.e. felony,
assault, lewdness, etc., however, the State made no allegation nor
provided any testimony of any second element other than the charged

theft.
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Therefore, a requisite element of the offense is the intent to
commit a theft after entering or remaining in a building. While defense
counsel recognizes the difference between intent and action, in the case
at bar, no reasonable jury could find the one without the other, given
the facts of the case.
In the case of State v. Hancock

874 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App.

Ct. 1994) this Court held;
When considering an inconsistency challenge to jury
verdicts, we "review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict" and will "not overturn a jury's
verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds
could not rationally have arrived at a verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the law and on the
evidence presented." (Citing State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d
510, 511, (Utah App. Ct. 1989)
When multiple crimes are charged and when those crimes
each require proof of different elements, there is no
inconsistency between guilty verdicts on some and not
guilty verdicts on others. {State v. Hancock @ 134)

In the case of State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 510, (Utah App. Ct.
1989) the court held:
It is the jury's prerogative to weigh the evidence, infer the
material facts from it, and apply the law stated in the jury
instructions to the facts. In order to preserve this
prerogative, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and do not overturn a jury's
verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds
could not rationally have arrived at a verdict of guilty
25

beyond a reasonable doubt based on the law and on the
evidence presented.

The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d
610, 613 (Utah 1968) has held that inconsistent verdicts (i.e. where one
defendant is acquitted and one found guilty) are not grounds for a
reversal of a conviction. That instance, however, is much different
from the case at bar.
The case at bar presents this Court with a unique issue as to
whether once the jury returns a finding of not guilty on an underlying
theft charge, does the burglary charge, by operation of law, fail as well.
It is clear that the Utah statute requires the concert of both an unlawful
entry as well as intent to commit a theft. If a jury finds that the state has
failed in it's burden of proof on the theft case, that same jury cannot
somehow find that the state has met it's burden on the burglary, since
the theft is an essential element of that charge.
Other jurisdictions have explored this issue, and although some
have affirmed a conviction where a jury returned a verdict of guilt on a
burglary and not guilty on the underlying theft charge, in each of those
cases the evidence readily pointed to an intent to commit theft. Some
of those cases are as follows:
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In McCovens v. State, 539 N.E.2d 26, (Indiana 1989) The
Court held that the finding of guilt on burglary and an acquittal on the
underlying theft charges were not inconsistent since the evidence
showed the unlawful entry, and an attempted theft, but no theft had
occurred. In State v. Hall, 764 P.2d 926, (Oregon Ct. App. 1988), the
Court held that since the defendant was interrupted as he was entering
the premises, the acquittal on the theft was not inconsistent with the
burglary conviction since the intent to commit theft could be reasonably
inferred by the jury. See also May v. State, 810 N.E.2d 741 (Indiana Ct.
App. 2004) where the Court upheld another burglary interrupted in
progress where the jury returned a not guilty verdict on the underlying
theft charge.
In the case of People v. Gibson, 449 N.E.2d 182 (111. Ct. App.
1983) the Court upheld a burglary conviction in light of the fact that the
jury acquitted on the theft charge. In that case, however, the not guilty
finding on the theft was a failure to prove the value over $150. In State
v. Radi, 578 P.2d 1169, 1176 (Mont. 1978), reaffirmed in State v. Radi,
604 P.2d 318, 323 (Mont. 1979) the court allowed a guilty verdict on a
burglary charge to stand in light of a not guilty verdict on a theft
charge, where the "jury was instructed to find the defendant not guilty
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of the theft if they found him guilty of burglary." In People v. Wilfong,
390 N.E.2d 934 (111. Ct. App. 1979) the Court affirmed the conviction
of a burglary with a corresponding not guilty verdict on a grand theft
auto, where the court noted that there was evidence that the defendant
had "rifl[ed] through [the victim's] dresser drawer (which was noted in
the trial), indicating] that defendant was looking for something."
Additionally, the defendant did steal the keys to the automobile.
CONCLUSION
The State charged the defendant with burglary and theft. The
State had the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, and failed in its burden.

Once the jury returned with

a finding of not guilty on the theft charge, the burglary charge by
operation of law should have also failed. Defense counsel was
ineffective in failing to notice this inconsistency and the trial court
compounded that failure by committing plain error in not rectifying the
situation by entering a judgment of acquittal on the case. For these
reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse his
conviction.
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DATED this J_ day of March 2005.

RANDALL W. RICHARDS;
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor, PO Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0180 and AmyHugie, Box
Elder County Attorney, 01 South Main, Brigham-€jty, UT 84302/f>osta^e prepaid
/
this jlday of March, 2005.

iNDALL W. RTCHARD
Attorney at Law
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ADDENDUM A

JON J. BUNDERSON
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
45 NORTH 100 EAST
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 84302
TELEPHONE: (435) 734-9464
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTBOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
INFORMATION
Plaintiff,
vs.
Criminal No.

JOSEPH DELEE ATENCIO,
15350 NORTH 5325 WEST
RIVERSIDE, UT 84334
DOB: 12/19/64

/ , ir • ' rA

Investigating Officer:
LARRY JOHNSTON

Defendant(s)
The undersigned, as prosecuting attorney, hereby charges the
defendant(s) with committing, at Box Elder County, State of Utah,
the crime(s) of:
COUNT I
BURGLARY, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE, AT Box Elder County, Utah,
ON OR ABOUT July 11th or 12th, 2002, IN VIOLATION OF Section 766-202, UCA (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON THE DATE AFORESAID
THE DEFENDANT(S) DID ENTER OR REMAIN UNLAWFULLY IN A BUILDING, TO
WIT, THE OFFICE OF IMS STEEL, WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY
OR THEFT.

COUNT II
THEFT, A CLASS »B" MISDEMEANOR, AT Box Elder County, Utah, ON OR
ABOUT July 11th or 12th, 2002, IN VIOLATION OF Section 76-6-404,

UCA (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON THE DATE AFORESAID THE
DEFENDANT DID OBTAIN OR EXERCISE UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL OVER THE
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER,

TO WIT, IMS STEEL, WITH A PURPOSE TO

DEPRIVE HIM THEREOF, SAID PROPERTY HAVING A VALUE OF $300.00 OR
LESS.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses:
LARRY JOHNSTON, KEVIN POTTER, LARRY BLANCHARD, JOSHUA RASMUSSEN,
SUSAN MILLER, TODD MARSHALL, PAUL RIMMASCH, RUSSELL DEAN.

DATED this £} &

day of

*%/ufJf

IDERSON
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
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ADDENDUM B

BURGLARY, Instruction No.
Defendant Joseph Atencio has been charged with burglary. To prove that
Defendant committed burglary, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft.

ADDEMDUM C

Amy F. Hugie, 8207
Box Elder County Attorney
01 South Main
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (435) 734-3329
Fax:
(435) 734-3374

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER ON
SENTENCING
Court Case #: 021100094

vs.
JOSEPH DELEE ATENCIO ,

Judge: Ben H. Hadfield

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regularly for sentencing on March 30,
2004, before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally
together with his counsel of record, Justin Bond. The State was represented by a
member of the Box Elder County Attorney's Office.
No legal or other reason having been shown why judgment should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant is hereby convicted of
the following crime(s):
1: BURGLARY, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202,
a third degree felony.
based upon his/her guilty plea.
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction, it is the Judgment and Order of the
Court that the Defendant is hereby sentenced to be incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison for a term of 0 to 5 years. Execution of the prison sentence is suspended and

the Defendant is placed on probation for a period of 36 months on the following terms
and conditions:
1.

Defendant shall remain incarcerated in the Box Elder County Jail for 90 days with
credit for time served. Work release may be permitted with verifiable
employment.

2.

Defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State Department of Adult
Probation and Parole [hereinafter "AP&P"] and comply strictly with the terms and
conditions of said agreement, including consenting to any search and seizure of
his/her person, property, or bodily fluids by any law enforcement personnel to
determine Defendant's compliance with the terms of probation.

3.

Defendant shall report to AP&P and to the Court whenever required.

4.

Defendant shall violate no law, state, federal, or municipal except minor traffic
violations.

5.

Defendant shall pay a fine of $925 with an additional $25 court security fee.
Interest may increase the final amount due. Credit may be given for any out of
pocket counseling expenses.

6.

Defendant shall pay a $300 PDA recoupment fee.

7.

Defendant shall pay restitution of $410.94 or amount as indicated in a restitution
hearing. Interest may increase the final amount due.

8.

Defendant shall obtain any evaluation for drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse
therapy as may be required by AP&P, or the Court, and Defendant shall enter
into, and successfully complete, and pay for any counseling, therapy, or other
program ordered by AP&P, through a provider approved by AP&P, and shall

successfully complete all required after care.
9.

Defendant shall not use or possess any alcohol or controlled substances or
frequent any place where alcohol or controlled substances are being used, nor
associate with any person who uses or is consuming alcohol or any controlled
substance.

10. Defendant shall submit to random search and seizure of his breath or bodily
fluids including random urinalysis as requested by a probation agent.
11. Defendant shall obtain a probation identification card in a form prescribed by
AP&P and shall carry it at all times and shall display the same to any law
enforcement officer with whom Defendant comes into contact in the officer's
official capacity.
12.

Defendant shall abide by all the terms and conditions of electronic monitoring
required by AP&P.

13. Defendant shall maintain all curfews required by AP&P.
14. That the Defendant shall submit to and pay for DNA testing as required by
statute.
15. Defendant shall maintain full time school or employment. Defendant shall
perform 20 hours of community service when not in verifiable employment.
16. Defendant shall participate in the TEAM program and abide by its requirements.
17. Defendant shall submit a letter of apology to his victim.

The Court retains jurisdiction for further action in this matter.
DATED this

£

day of

Apr,'I

. 2004.

•73-//. t\.
Ben H. Hadfield, Judg^
First Judicial District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of April, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document, postage pre-paid to:
Justin Bond, Esq.
29 South Main
Bfigham City, UT 84302

Legaf Secretary

ADDENDUM D

Page 123
1

THE COURT:

21 deliberating.

We're in chambers.

I've been handed

The jury is out

a note from the jury that

3

says, "Is the defendant right or left handed?"

4

the court that what I have to tell them is the evidence is

5

all in.

6

evidence they heard and any observations they made.

7

add anything to the record at this point.

8

that?

9

It seems to

They have to make their decision based on the

MR. RASMUSSEN:

10

MR. LINARES:

Ill

THE COURT:

We can't

Any objection to

I think that's accurate.
I don't object to it.

I'll write as follows:

"You must make

12

your decision based upon your observations and the evidence

13

presented."

14

THE COURT:

16 verdict.

18

It appears that the jury has reached a

I'll ask the bailiff to return the jury to the

courtroom.
(Jury returned with verdict at 4:15 p.m.)

19
20

We'll keep you posted.

(Further recess pending deliberations.)

15

17

Thank you, counsel.

THE COURT:
the foreperson.

Mr. Webb, it would appear that you are

Is that correct?

21

MR. WEBB:

22

THE COURT:

Yes.
Please hand the verdict to the bailiff.

23

(Pause.)

We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn, find the

24

defendant, count one, guilty of burglary, a felony of the

25

third degree.

Count two, not guilty of theft, a class B

Page 124
1
21

misdemeanor.
Do counsel

desire to have the jury polled?

3

MR. RASMUSSEN:

4

MR. LINARES:

5

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
No, Your Honor.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this

6

concludes your service.

7

and consideration.

8

will ask you to fill out now.

9

I'll come back to the jury room and visit with you and see if

10

There's a short survey that the clerk
As soon as that's completed

there's any questions I can answer now that the verdict is

111 returned.
12

I want to thank you for your time

Thank you for your service.

(Jury out of the courtroom.)

13

THE COURT:

Any questions, counsel?

I'm going to

14

schedule sentencing for March 30th at 9:00 a.m.

15

the defendant to go over to the office of Adult Probation and

16

Parole.

17

five.

Go over there this afternoon.
Just schedule an appointment.

I'll direct

They're open until
They won't be able to

18 meet with you today, but schedule an appointment so that they
19
201

can begin a presentence report.
Any matters either side want to place in the record?

21

MR. RASMUSSEN:

22

MR. LINARES:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE BAILIFF:

25

Not from the state, Your Honor.
Nothing, Your Honor.

Thank you.

Court is in recess.

Court is in recess.

(Trial concluded at 4:17 p.m.)

